We construct the first (key-policy) attribute-based encryption (ABE) system with short secret keys: the size of keys in our system depends only on the depth of the policy circuit, not its size. Our constructions extend naturally to arithmetic circuits with arbitrary fan-in gates thereby further reducing the circuit depth. Building on this ABE system we obtain the first reusable circuit garbling scheme that produces garbled circuits whose size is the same as the original circuit plus an additive poly(λ, d) bits, where λ is the security parameter and d is the circuit depth. Save the additive poly(λ, d) factor, this is the best one could hope for. All previous constructions incurred a multiplicative poly(λ) blowup. As another application, we obtain (single key secure) functional encryption with short secret keys.
Introduction
(Key-policy) attribute-based encryption [SW05, GPSW06] is a public-key encryption mechanism where every secret key sk f is associated with some function f : X → Y and an encryption of a message µ is labeled with a public attribute vector x ∈ X . The encryption of µ can be decrypted using sk f only if f (x) = 0 ∈ Y. Intuitively, the security requirement is collusion resistance: a coalition of users learns nothing about the plaintext message µ if none of their individual keys are authorized to decrypt the ciphertext.
Attribute-based encryption (ABE) is a powerful generalization of identity-based encryption [Sha84, BF03, Coc01] and fuzzy IBE [SW05, ABV + 12] and is a special case of functional encryption [BSW11] . It is used as a building-block in applications that demand complex access control to encrypted data [PTMW06] , in designing protocols for verifiably outsourcing computations [PRV12] , and for single-use functional encryption [GKP + 13b] . Here we focus on key-policy ABE where the access policy is embedded in the secret key. The dual notion called ciphertext-policy ABE can be realized from this using universal circuits, as explained in [GPSW06, GGH + 13c] .
The past few years have seen much progress in constructing secure and efficient ABE schemes from different assumptions and for different settings. The first constructions [GPSW06, LOS + 10, OT10, LW12, Wat12, Boy13, HW13] apply to predicates computable by Boolean formulas which are a subclass of log-space computations. More recently, important progress has been made on constructions for the set of all polynomial-size circuits: Gorbunov, Vaikuntanathan, and Wee [GVW13] gave a construction from the Learning With Errors (LWE) problem and Garg, Gentry, Halevi, Sahai, and Waters [GGH + 13c] gave a construction using multilinear maps. In both constructions the policy functions are represented as Boolean circuits composed of fan-in 2 gates and the secret key size is proportional to the size of the circuit.
Our results. We present two new key-policy ABE systems. Our first system, which is the centerpiece of this paper, is an ABE based on the learning with errors problem [Reg05] that supports functions f represented as arithmetic circuits with large fan-in gates. It has secret keys whose size is proportional to depth of the circuit for f , not its size. Secret keys in previous ABE constructions contained an element (such as a matrix) for every gate or wire in the circuit. In our scheme the secret key is a single matrix corresponding only to the final output wire from the circuit. We prove selective security of the system and observe that by a standard complexity leveraging argument (as in [BB11] ) the system can be made adaptively secure. Theorem 1.1 (Informal). Let λ be the security parameter. Assuming subexponential LWE, there is an ABE scheme for the class of functions with depth-d circuits where the size of the secret key for a circuit C is poly(λ, d).
Our second ABE system, based on multilinear maps ( [BS02] , [GGH13a] ), optimizes the ciphertext size rather than the secret key size. The construction here relies on a generalization of broadcast encryption [FN93, BGW05, BW13] and the attribute-based encryption scheme of [GGH + 13c] . Previously, ABE schemes with short ciphertexts were known only for the class of Boolean formulas [ALdP11] . Theorem 1.2 (Informal). Let λ be the security parameter. Assuming that d-level multilinear maps exist, there is an ABE scheme for the class of functions with depth-d circuits where the size of the encryption of an attribute vector x is |x| + poly(λ, d).
Our ABE schemes result in a number of applications and have many desirable features, which we describe next.
Applications to reusable garbled circuits. Over the years, garbled circuits and variants have found many uses: in two party [Yao86] and multi-party secure protocols [GMW87, BMR90] , onetime programs [GKR08] , key-dependent message security [BHHI10] , verifiable computation [GGP10] , homomorphic computations [GHV10] and many others. Classical circuit garbling schemes produced single-use garbled circuits which could only be used in conjunction with one garbled input. Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13b] recently showed the first fully reusable circuit garbling schemes and used them to construct token-based program obfuscation schemes and k-time programs [GKP + 13b] .
Most known constructions of both single-use and reusable garbled circuits proceed by garbling each gate to produce a garbled truth table, resulting in a multiplicative size blowup of poly(λ). A fundamental question regarding garbling schemes is: How small can the garbled circuit be?
There are three exceptions to the gate-by-gate garbling method that we are aware of. The first is the "free XOR" optimization for single-use garbling schemes introduced by Kolesnikov and Schneider [KS08] where one produces garbled tables only for the AND gates in the circuit C. This still results in a multiplicative poly(λ) overhead but proportional to the number of AND gates (as opposed to the total number of gates). Secondly, Lu and Ostrovsky [LO13] recently showed a single-use garbling scheme for RAM programs, where the size of the garbled program grows as poly(λ) times its running time. Finally, Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13a] show how to (reusably) garble non-uniform Turing machines under a non-standard and non-falsifiable assumption and incurring a multiplicative poly(λ) overhead in the size of the non-uniformity of the machine. In short, all known garbling schemes (even in the single-use setting) suffer from a multiplicative overhead of poly(λ) in the circuit size or the running time.
Using our first ABE scheme (based on LWE) in conjunction with the techniques of Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13b] , we obtain the first reusable garbled circuits whose size is |C| + poly(λ, d). For large and shallow circuits, such as those that arise from database lookup, search and some machine learning applications, this gives significant bandwidth savings over previous methods (even in the single use setting).
Theorem 1.3 (Informal)
. Assuming subexponential LWE, there is a reusable circuit garbling scheme that garbles a depth-d circuit C into a circuitĈ such that |Ĉ| = |C| + poly(λ, d), and garbles an input x into an encoded inputx such that |x| = |x| · poly(λ, d).
We next ask if we can obtain short garbled inputs of size |x| = |x|+poly(λ, d), analogous to what we achieved for the garbled circuit. In a beautiful recent work, Applebaum, Ishai, Kushilevitz and Waters [AIKW13] showed constructions of single-use garbled circuits with short garbled inputs of size |x| = |x| + poly(λ). We remark that while their garbled inputs are short, their garbled circuits still incur a multiplicative poly(λ) overhead.
Using our second ABE scheme (based on multilinear maps) in conjunction with the techniques of Goldwasser et al. [GKP + 13b] , we obtain the first reusable garbling scheme with garbled inputs of size |x| + poly(λ, d).
Theorem 1.4 (Informal).
Assuming subexponential LWE and the existence of d-level multilinear maps, there is a reusable circuit garbling scheme that garbles a depth-d circuit C into a circuit C such that |Ĉ| = |C| · poly(λ, d), and garbles an input x into an encoded inputx such that |x| = |x| + poly(λ, d).
A natural open question is to construct a scheme which produces both short garbled circuits and short garbled inputs. We first focus on describing the ABE schemes and then give details of the garbling scheme.
ABE for arithmetic circuits. For a prime q, our first ABE system (based on LWE) directly handles arithmetic circuits with weighted addition and multiplication gates over Z q , namely gates of the form
where the weights α i can be arbitrary elements in Z q . Previous ABE constructions worked with Boolean circuits.
Addition gates g + take arbitrary inputs x 1 , . . . , x k ∈ Z q . However, for multiplication gates g × , we require that the inputs are somewhat smaller than q, namely in the range [−p, p] for some p < q. (In fact, our construction allows for one of the inputs to g × to be arbitrarily large in Z q ). Hence, while f : Z q → Z q can be an arbitrary polynomial-size arithmetic circuit, decryption will succeed only for attribute vectors x for which f (x) = 0 and the inputs to all multiplication gates in the circuit are in [−p, p]. We discuss the relation between p and q at the end of the section.
We can in turn apply our arithmetic ABE construction to Boolean circuits with large fan-in resulting in potentially large savings over constructions restricted to fan-in two gates. An AND gate can be implemented as ∧(x 1 , . . . , x k ) = x 1 · · · x k and an OR gate as ∨(x 1 , . . . ,
In this setting, the inputs to the gates g + and g × are naturally small, namely in {0, 1}. Thus, unbounded fan-in allows us to consider circuits with smaller size and depth, and results in smaller overall parameters.
ABE with key delegation. Our first ABE system also supports key delegation. That is, using the master secret key, user Alice can be given a secret key sk f for a function f that lets her decrypt whenever the attribute vector x satisfies f (x) = 0. In our system, for any function g, Alice can then issue a delegated secret key sk f ∧g to Bob that lets Bob decrypt if and only if the attribute vector x satisfies f (x) = g(x) = 0. Bob can further delegate to Charlie, and so on. The size of the secret key increases quadratically with the number of delegations.
We note that Gorbunov et al. [GVW13] showed that their ABE system for Boolean circuits supports a somewhat restricted form of delegation. Specifically, they demonstrated that using a secret key sk f for a function f , and a secret key sk g for a function g, it is possible to issue a secret key sk f ∧g for the function f ∧ g. In this light, our work resolves the naturally arising open problem of providing full delegation capabilities (i.e., issuing sk f ∧g using only sk f ).
More precisely, suppose c is an encryption of message µ under public-key x ∈ Z q . There is a public algorithm Eval ct (f, x, c) −→ c f that outputs a ciphertext c f that is an encryption of µ under the public-key f (x) ∈ Z q . In our constructions Eval ct is deterministic and its running time is proportional to the size of the arithmetic circuit for f .
If we give user Alice the secret-key for the public-key 0 ∈ Z q then Alice can use Eval ct to decrypt c whenever f (x) = 0, as required for ABE. Unfortunately, this ABE is completely insecure! This is because the secret key is not bound to the function f : Alice could decrypt any ciphertext encrypted under x by simply finding some function g such that g(x) = 0.
To construct a secure ABE we slightly extend the basic key-homomorphism idea. A base encryption public-key is a tuple x ∈ Z q as before, however Eval ct produces ciphertexts encrypted under the public key (f (x), f ) where f (x) ∈ Z q and f is an encoding of the circuit computing f . Transforming a ciphertext c from the public key x to (f (x), f ) is done using algorithm Eval ct (f, x, c) −→ c f as before. To simplify the notation we write a public-key (y, f ) as simply (y, f ). The precise syntax and security requirements for key-homomorphic public-key encryption are provided in Section 3.
To build an ABE we simply publish the parameters of the key-homomorphic PKE system. A message µ is encrypted with attribute vector x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ Z q that serves as the public key. Let c be the resulting ciphertext. Given an arithmetic circuit f , the key-homomorphic property lets anyone transform c into an encryption of µ under key (f (x), f ). The point is that now the secret key for the function f can simply be the decryption key for the public-key (0, f ). This key enables the decryption of c when f (x) = 0 as follows: the decryptor first uses Eval ct (f, x, c) −→ c f to transform the ciphertext to the public key (f (x), f ). It can then decrypt c f using the decryption key it was given whenever f (x) = 0. We show that this results in a secure ABE.
A construction from learning with errors. Fix some n ∈ Z + , prime q, and m = Θ(n log q). Let A, G and B 1 , . . . , B be matrices in Z n×m q that will be part of the system parameters. To encrypt a message µ under the public key x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ Z q we use a variant of dual Regev encryption [Reg05, GPV08] using the following matrix as the public key:
We obtain a ciphertext c x . We note that this encryption algorithm is the same as encryption in the hierarchical IBE system of [ABB10] and encryption in the predicate encryption for inner-products of [AFV11] .
We show that, remarkably, this system is key-homomorphic: given a function f : Z q → Z q computed by a poly-size arithmetic circuit, anyone can transform the ciphertext c x into a dual Regev encryption for the public-key matrix
where the matrix B f ∈ Z n×m q serves as the encoding of the circuit for the function f . This B f is uniquely determined by f and B 1 , . . . , B . The work needed to compute B f is proportional to the size of the arithmetic circuit for f .
To illustrate the idea, assume that we have the ciphertext under the public key (x, y): c x = (c 0 | c x | c y ). Here c 0 = A T s + e, c x = (xG + B 1 ) T s + e 1 and c y = (yG + B 2 ) T s + e 2 . To compute the ciphertext under the public key (x + y, B + ) one takes the sum of the ciphertexts c x and c y .
The result is the encryption under the matrix
where B + = B 1 + B 2 . One of the main contributions of this work is a novel method of multiplying the public keys. Together with addition, described above, this gives full key-homomorphism. To construct the ciphertext under the public key (xy, B × ), we first compute a small-norm matrix R ∈ Z m×m q , s.t. GR = −B 1 . With this in mind we compute
T s, and
Adding the two expressions above gives us
which is a ciphertext under the public key (xy, B × ) where B × = B 2 R. Note that performing this operation requires that we know y. This is the reason why this method gives an ABE and not (private index) predicate encryption. In Section 4.1 we show how to generalize this mechanism to arithmetic circuits with arbitrary fan-in gates.
As explained above, this key-homomorphism gives us an ABE for arithmetic circuits: the public parameters contain random matrices B 1 , . . . , B ∈ Z n×m q and encryption to an attribute vector x in Z q is done using dual Regev encryption to the matrix (1). A decryption key sk f for an arithmetic circuit f : Z q → Z q is a decryption key for the public-key matrix (A | 0 · G + B f ) = (A|B f ). This key enables decryption whenever f (x) = 0. The key sk f can be easily generated using a short basis for the lattice Λ ⊥ q (A) which serves as the master secret key. We prove selective security from the learning with errors problem (LWE) by using another homomorphic property of the system implemented in an algorithm called Eval sim . Using Eval sim the simulator responds to the adversary's private key queries and then solves the given LWE challenge.
Parameters and performance. Applying algorithm Eval ct (f, x, c) to a ciphertext c increases the magnitude of the noise in the ciphertext by a factor that depends on the depth of the circuit for f . A k-way addition gate (g + ) increases the norm of the noise by a factor of O(km). A k-way multiplication gate (g × ) where all (but one) of the inputs are in [−p, p] increases the norm of the noise by a factor of O(p k−1 m). Therefore, if the circuit for f has depth d, the noise in c grows in the worst case by a factor of O((p k−1 m) d ). Note that the weights α i used in the gates g + and g × have no effect on the amount of noise added.
For decryption to work correctly the modulus q should be slightly larger than the noise in the ciphertext. Hence, we need q on the order of Ω(B · (p k−1 m) d ) where B is the maximum magnitude of the noise added to the ciphertext during encryption. For security we rely on the hardness of the learning with errors (LWE) problem, which requires that the ratio q/B is not too large. In particular, the underlying problem is believed to be hard even when q/B is 2 (n ) for some fixed 0 < < 1/2. In our settings q/B = Ω (p k−1 m) d . Then to support circuits of depth t(λ) for some polynomial t(·) we choose n such that n ≥ t(λ) (1/ ) · (2 log 2 n + k log p) 1/ , set q = 2 (n ) , m = Θ(n log q), and the LWE noise bound to B = O(n). This ensures correctness of decryption and hardness of LWE since we have Ω((p k m) t(λ) ) < q ≤ 2 (n ) , as required. The ABE system of [GVW13] uses similar parameters due to a similar growth in noise as a function of circuit depth.
Secret key size. A decryption key in our system is a single 2m × m low-norm matrix, namely the trapdoor for the matrix (A|B f ). Since m = Θ(n log q) and log 2 q grows linearly with the circuit depth d, the overall secret key size grows as O(d 2 ) with the depth. In previous ABE systems for circuits [GVW13, GGH + 13c] secret keys grew as O(d 2 s) where s is the number of boolean gates or wires in the circuit.
Other related work. Predicate encryption [BW07, KSW08] provides a stronger privacy guarantee than ABE by additionally hiding the attribute vector x. Predicate encryption systems for inner product functionalities can be built from bilinear maps [KSW08] and LWE [AFV11] . More recently, Garg et al. [GGH + 13b] constructed functional encryption (which implies predicate encryption) for all polynomial-size functionalities using indistinguishability obfuscation.
The encryption algorithm in our system is similar to that in the hierarchical-IBE of Agrawal, Boneh, and Boyen [ABB10] . We show that this system is key-homomorphic for polynomial-size arithmetic circuits which gives us an ABE for such circuits. The first hint of the key homomorphic properties of the [ABB10] system was presented by Agrawal, Freeman, and Vaikuntanathan [AFV11] who showed that the system is key-homomorphic with respect to low-weight linear transformations and used this fact to construct a (private index) predicate encryption system for inner-products. To handle high-weight linear transformations [AFV11] used bit decomposition to represent the large weights as bits. This expands the ciphertext by a factor of log 2 q, but adds more functionality to the system. Our ABE, when presented with a circuit containing only linear gates (i.e. only g + gates), also provides a predicate encryption system for inner products in the same security model as [AFV11] , but can handle high-weight linear transformations directly, without bit decomposition, thereby obtaining shorter ciphertexts and public-keys.
A completely different approach to building circuit ABE was presented by Garg, Gentry, Sahai, and Waters [GGSW13] who showed that a general primitive they named witness encryption implies circuit ABE when combined with witness indistinguishable proofs.
Preliminaries
For a random variable X we denote by x ← X the process of sampling a value x according to the distribution of X. Similarly, for a finite set S we denote by x ← S the process of sampling a value x according to the uniform distribution over S. A non-negative function ν(λ) is negligible if for every polynomial p(λ) it holds that ν(λ) ≤ 1/p(λ) for all sufficiently large λ ∈ N.
The statistical distance between two random variables X and Y over a finite domain Ω is defined as 
is negligible in λ.
Attribute-Based Encryption
An attribute-based encryption (ABE) scheme for a class of functions F λ = {f : X λ → Y λ } is a quadruple Π = (Setup, Keygen, Enc, Dec) of probabilistic polynomial-time algorithms. Setup takes a unary representation of the security parameter λ and outputs public parameters mpk and a master secret key msk; Keygen(msk, f ∈ F λ ) output a decryption key sk f ; Enc(mpk, x ∈ X λ , µ) outputs a ciphertext c, the encryption of message µ labeled with attribute vector x; Dec(sk f , c) outputs a message µ or the special symbol ⊥. (When clear from the context, we drop the subscript λ from X λ , Y λ and F λ .)
Correctness. We require that for every circuit f ∈ F, attribute vector x ∈ X where f (x) = 0, and message µ, it holds that Dec(sk f , c) = µ with an overwhelming probability over the choice of (mpk, msk) ← Setup(λ), c ← Enc(mpk, x, µ), and sk f ← Keygen(msk, f ).
Security. For the most part, we consider the standard notion of selective security for ABE schemes [GPSW06] . Specifically, we consider adversaries that first announce a challenge attribute vector x * , and then receive the public parameters mpk of the scheme and oracle access to a keygeneration oracle KG(msk, x * , f ) that returns the secret key sk f for f ∈ F if f (x * ) = 0 and returns ⊥ otherwise. We require that any such efficient adversary has only a negligible probability in distinguishing between the ciphertexts of two different messages encrypted under the challenge attribute x * . Formally, security is captured by the following definition.
Definition 2.1 (Selectively-secure ABE). An ABE scheme Π = (Setup, Keygen, Enc, Dec) for a class of functions
where for each b ∈ {0, 1} and λ ∈ N the experiment EXP
ABE,Π,A (λ) is defined as follows:
where KG(msk, x * , f ) returns a secret key sk f = Keygen(msk, f ) if f (x * ) = 0 and ⊥ otherwise.
A fully secure ABE scheme is defined similarly, except that the adversary can choose the challenge attribute x * after seeing the master public key and making polynomially many secret key queries. The following lemma, attributed to [BB11] , says that any selectively secure ABE scheme is also fully secure with an exponential loss in parameters.
Lemma 2.2. For any selectively secure ABE scheme with attribute vectors of length = (λ), there is a negligible function ν(λ) such that Adv
Background on Lattices
Lattices. Let q, n, m be positive integers. For a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q we let Λ ⊥ q (A) denote the lattice {x ∈ Z m : Ax = 0 in Z q }. More generally, for u ∈ Z n q we let Λ u q (A) denote the coset {x ∈ Z m : Ax = u in Z q }.
We note the following elementary fact: if the columns of T A ∈ Z m×m are a basis of the lattice Λ ⊥ q (A), then they are also a basis for the lattice Λ ⊥ q (xA) for any nonzero x ∈ Z q .
Learning with errors (LWE) [Reg05] . Fix integers n, m, a prime integer q and a noise distribution χ over Z. The (n, m, q, χ)-LWE problem is to distinguish the following two distributions:
where
Throughout the paper we always set m = Θ(n log q) and simply refer to the (n, q, χ)-LWE problem.
We say that a noise distribution χ is B-bounded if its support is in [−B, B]. For any fixed d > 0 and sufficiently large q, Regev [Reg05] (through a quantum reduction) and Peikert [Pei09] (through a classical reduction) show that taking χ as a certain q/n d -bounded distribution, the (n, q, χ)-LWE problem is as hard as approximating the worst-case GapSVP to n O(d) factors, which is believed to be intractable. More generally, let χ max < q be the bound on the noise distribution. The difficulty of the LWE problem is measured by the ratio q/χ max . This ratio is always bigger than 1 and the smaller it is the harder the problem. The problem appears to remain hard even when q/χ max < 2 n for some fixed ∈ (0, 1/2).
Matrix norms. For a vector u we let u denote its 2 norm. For a matrix R ∈ Z k×m , letR be the result of applying Gram-Schmidt (GS) orthogonalization to the columns of R. We define three matrix norms:
• R denotes the 2 length of the longest column of R.
• R GS = R whereR is the GS orthogonalization of R.
• R 2 is the operator norm of R defined as
We will use the following algorithm, throughout our paper:
BD(A) −→ R where m = n log q : a deterministic algorithm that takes in a matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and outputs a matrix R ∈ Z m×m q , where each element a ∈ Z q that belongs to the matrix A gets transformed into a column vector r ∈ Z log, r = [a 0 , ..., a log q −1 ] T . Here a i is the i-th bit of the binary decomposition of a ordered from LSB to MSB. Trapdoor generators. The following lemma states properties of algorithms for generating short basis of lattices.
Lemma 2.4. Let n, m, q > 0 be integers with q prime. There are polynomial time algorithms with the properties below:
: a randomized algorithm that, when m = Θ(n log q), outputs a full-rank matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and basis T A ∈ Z m×m for Λ ⊥ q (A) such that A is negl(n)-close to uniform and T GS = O( √ n log q), with all but negligible probability in n.
•
algorithm that given full-rank matrices A, G ∈ Z n×m q and a basis
• For m = n log q there is a fixed full-rank matrix
To simplify the notation we will always assume that the matrix G from part 4 of Lemma 2.4 has the same width m as the matrix A output by algorithm TrapGen from part 1 of the lemma. We do so without loss of generality since G can always be extended to the size of A by adding zero columns on the right of G.
Discrete Gaussians. Regev [Reg05] defined a natural distribution on Λ u q (A) called a discrete Gaussian parameterized by a scalar σ > 0. We use D σ (Λ u q (A)) to denote this distribution. For a random matrix A ∈ Z n×m q and σ =Ω( √ n), a vector x sampled from D σ (Λ u q (A)) has 2 norm less than σ √ m with probability at least 1 − negl(m).
with overwhelming probability in m.
Proof. For the {±1} matrix S the lemma follows from Litvak et al. [LPRTJ05] (Fact 2.4). For the matrix R the lemma follow from the fact that
Solving AX = U. We review algorithms for finding a low-norm matrix X ∈ Z m×k such that AX = U.
Lemma 2.6. Let A ∈ Z n×m q and T A ∈ Z m×m be a basis for
There are polynomial time algorithms that output X ∈ Z m×k satisfying AX = U with the properties below:
, outputs a random sample X from a distribution that is statistically close to
• RandBasis(A,
√ m with all but negligible probability.
Randomness extraction. We conclude with a variant of the left-over hash lemma from [ABB10] .
Lemma 2.7. Suppose that m > (n + 1) log 2 q + ω(log n) and that q > 2 is prime. Let S be an m × k matrix chosen uniformly in {1, −1} m×k mod q where k = k(n) is polynomial in n. Let A and B be matrices chosen uniformly in Z n×m q and Z n×k q respectively. Then, for all vectors e in Z m q , the distribution (A, AS, S T e) is statistically close to the distribution (A, B, S T e).
Note that the lemma holds for every vector e in Z m q , including low norm vectors.
Additional algorithms Throughout the paper we will use the following algorithms:
, outputs a random sample X ∈ Z 2m×m q from a distribution that is statistically close to D σ (Λ U q ((A|B))). This algorithm is the composition of two algorithms: ExtendRight(A, T A , B) −→ T (A|B) and SampleD((A|B), T (A|B) , U, σ) −→ X.
• SampleLeft(A, S, y, U, σ) : a randomized algorithm that given full-rank matrix
, where G is the matrix from Lemma 2.4, part 4. This algorithm is the composition of two algorithms:
Multilinear Maps
Assume there exists a group generator G that takes the security parameter 1 λ and the pairing bound k and outputs groups G 1 , . . . , G k each of large prime order q > 2 λ . Let g i be the generator of group G i and let g = g 1 . In addition, the algorithm outputs a description of a set of bilinear maps:
We sometimes omit writing e ij and for convince simply use e as the map descriptor. , . . . , g
where β is a randomly chosen element in G k .
We note that if k = 2, then this corresponds exactly to the bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption (BDHE). Also, is easy to compute g 
Fully Key-Homomorphic PKE (FKHE)
Our new ABE constructions are a direct application of fully key-homomorphic public-key encryption (FKHE), a notion that we introduce. Such systems are public-key encryption schemes that are homomorphic with respect to the public encryption key. We begin by precisely defining FKHE and then show that a key-policy ABE with short keys arises naturally from such a system.
Let {X λ } λ∈N and {Y λ } λ∈N be sequences of finite sets. Let {F λ } λ∈N be a sequence of sets of functions, namely F λ = {f : X λ → Y λ } for some > 0. Public keys in an FKHE scheme are pairs (x, f ) ∈ Y λ × F λ . We call x the "value" and f the associated function. All such pairs are valid public keys. We also allow tuples x ∈ X λ to function as public keys. To simplify the notation we often drop the subscript λ and simply refer to sets X , Y and F.
In our constructions we set X = Z q for some q and let F be the set of -variate functions on Z q computable by polynomial size arithmetic circuits. Now, an FKHE scheme for the family of functions F consists of five PPT algorithms:
: outputs a master secret key msk FKHE and public parameters mpk FKHE .
• KeyGen FKHE msk FKHE , (y, f ) → sk y,f : outputs a decryption key for the public key (y, f ) ∈ Y × F.
• E FKHE mpk FKHE , x ∈ X , µ −→ c x : encrypts message µ under the public key x.
• Eval : a deterministic algorithm that implements key-homomorphism. Let c be an encryption of message µ under public key x ∈ X . For a function f : X → Y ∈ F the algorithm does:
where if y = f (x 1 , . . . , x ) then c f is an encryption of message µ under public-key (y, f ).
• D FKHE (sk y,f , c) : decrypts a ciphertext c with key sk y,f . If c is an encryption of µ under public key (x, g) then decryption succeeds only when x = y and f and g are identical arithmetic circuits.
Algorithm Eval captures the key-homomorphic property of the system: ciphertext c encrypted with key x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) is transformed to a ciphertext c f encrypted under key f (x 1 , . . . , x ), f .
Correctness. The key-homomorphic property is stated formally in the following requirement: For all (mpk FKHE , msk FKHE ) output by Setup, all messages µ, all f ∈ F, and x = (x 1 , . . . , x ) ∈ X :
An ABE from a FKHE. A FKHE for a family of functions F = {f : X → Y} immediately gives a key-policy ABE. Attribute vectors for the ABE are -tuples over X and the supported key-policies are functions in F. The ABE system works as follows:
• Setup(1 λ , ) : Run Setup FKHE (1 λ ) to get public parameters mpk and master secret msk. These function as the ABE public parameters and master secret.
Jumping ahead, we remark that in our FKHE instantiation (in Section 4), the number of bits needed to encode the function f in sk f depends only on the depth of the circuit computing f , not its size. Therefore, the size of sk f depends only on the depth complexity of f .
• Enc(mpk, x ∈ X , µ) : output (x, c) where
Note that c f is the encryption of the plaintext under the public key (f (x), f ). Since sk f is the decryption key for the public key (0, f ), decryption will succeed whenever f (x) = 0 as required.
The security of FKHE systems. Security for a fully key-homomorphic encryption system is defined so as to make the ABE system above secure. More precisely, we define security as follows.
Definition 3.1 (Selectively-secure FKHE). A fully key homomorphic encryption scheme Π = (Setup FKHE , KeyGen FKHE , E FKHE , Eval) for a class of functions
where for each b ∈ {0, 1} and λ ∈ N the experiment EXP (b) FKHE,Π,A (λ) is defined as:
where KG KH (msk FKHE , x * , y, f ) is an oracle that on input f ∈ F and y ∈ Y λ , returns ⊥ whenever f (x * ) = y, and otherwise returns KeyGen FKHE msk FKHE , (y, f ) .
With Definition 3.1 the following theorem is now immediate.
Theorem 3.2. The ABE system above is selectively secure provided the underlying FKHE is selectively secure.
4 An ABE and FKHE for arithmetic circuits from LWE
We now turn to building an FKHE for arithmetic circuits from the learning with errors (LWE) problem. This directly gives an ABE with short private keys as explained in Section 3. Our construction follows the key-homomorphism paradigm outlined in the introduction. For integers n and q = q(n) let m = Θ(n log q). Let G ∈ Z n×m q be the fixed matrix from Lemma 2.4 (part 4). For x ∈ Z q , B ∈ Z n×m q , s ∈ Z n q , and δ > 0 define the set
q where e < δ
For now we will assume the existence of three efficient deterministic algorithms Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim that implement the key-homomorphic features of the scheme and are at the heart of the construction. We present them in the next section. These three algorithms must satisfy the following properties with respect to some family of functions F = {f : (Z q ) → Z q } and a function α F : Z → Z.
Here x i ∈ Z q , B i ∈ Z n×m q and c i ∈ E s,δ (x i , B i ) for some s ∈ Z n q and δ > 0. Note that the same s is used for all c i . The output c f must satisfy , (B 1 , . . . , B ) ) and x = (x 1 , . . . , x ). We further require that ∆ < δ · α F (n) for some function α F (n) that measures the increase in the noise magnitude in c f compared to the input ciphertexts.
This algorithm captures the key-homomorphic property: it translates ciphertexts encrypted under public-keys {x i } i=1 into a ciphertext c f encrypted under public-key (f (x), f ).
. Here x * i ∈ Z q and S i ∈ Z m×m q . With x * = (x * 1 , . . . , x * n ), the output S f satisfies
We further require that for all f ∈ F, if S 1 , . . . , S are random matrices in {±1} m×m then S f 2 < α F (n) with all but negligible probability.
Definition 4.1. The deterministic algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) are α F -FKHE enabling for some family of functions F = {f : (Z q ) → Z q } if there are functions q = q(n) and α F = α F (n) for which the properties above are satisfied.
We want α F -FKHE enabling algorithms for a large function family F and the smallest possible α F . In the next section we build these algorithms for polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. The function α F (n) will depend on the depth of circuits in the family.
The FKHE system. Given FKHE-enabling algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) for a family of functions F = {f : (Z q ) → Z q } we build an FKHE for the same family of functions F. We prove selective security based on the learning with errors problem.
• Parameters : Choose n and q = q(n) as needed for (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) to be α F -FKHE enabling for the function family F. In addition, let χ be a χ max -bounded noise distribution for which the (n, q, χ)-LWE problem is hard as discussed in Appendix 2.2. As usual, we set m = Θ(n log q).
We instantiate these parameters concretely in the next section.
For correctness of the scheme we require that α 2 , (B 1 , . . . , B ) ).
Output sk y,f := R f where R f is a low-norm matrix in Z 2m×m sampled from the discrete
Here σ is sufficiently large for algorithm SampleRight since σ = T A GS · ω( √ log m), where
Note that the secret key sk y,f is always in Z 2m×m independent of the complexity of the function f . We assume sk y,f also implicitly includes mpk FKHE .
• E FKHE mpk FKHE , x ∈ X , µ −→ c x : Choose a random n dimensional vector s ← Z n q and error vectors e 0 , e 1 ← χ m . Choose uniformly random matrices
. Output the ciphertext c x .
• D FKHE (sk y,f , c) : Let c be the encryption of µ under public key (x, g). If x = y or f and g are not identical arithmetic circuits, output ⊥.
This completes the description of the system.
Correctness. The correctness of the scheme follows from our choice of parameters and, in particular, from the requirement α 2
we know that (A|yG + B f ) · R f = D and, by Lemma 2.5, R T f 2 < 2mσ with overwhelming probability. Therefore
with overwhelming probability. By the bounds on α F this quantity is less than q/4 thereby ensuring correct decryption of all bits of µ ∈ {0, 1} m .
Security. Next we prove that our FKHE is selectively secure for the family of functions F for which algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) are FKHE-enabling.
Theorem 4.2. Given the three algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) for the family of functions F, the FKHE system above is selectively secure with respect to F, assuming the (n, q, χ)-LWE assumption holds where n, q, χ are the parameters for the FKHE.
Proof idea. Before giving the complete proof we first briefly sketch the main proof idea which hinges on the properties of algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) and also employs ideas from [CHKP10, ABB10] . We build an LWE algorithm B that uses a selective FKHE attacker A to solve LWE. B is given an LWE challenge matrix (A|D) ∈ Z n×2m q and two vectors c in , c out ∈ Z m q that are either random or their concatenation equals (A|D) T s + e for some small noise vector e.
A starts by committing to the target attribute vector x = (x * 1 , . . . , x * ) ∈ Z q . In response B constructs the FKHE public parameters by choosing random matrices S * 1 , . . . , S * in {±1} m×m and setting B i = A S * i − x * i G. It gives A the public parameters mpk FKHE = (A, D, B 1 , . . . , B ). A standard argument shows that each of A S * i is uniformly distributed in Z n×m q so that all B i are uniform as required for the public parameters. Now, consider a private key query from A for a function f ∈ F and attribute y ∈ Z q . Only functions f and attributes y for which y * = f (x * 1 , . . . , x * ) = y are allowed. Let B f = Eval pk f, (B 1 , . . . , B ) . Then B needs to produce a matrix R f in Z 2m×m satisfying (A|B f )·R f = D. To do so B needs a recoding matrix from the lattice Λ ⊥ q (F) where F = (A|B f ) to the lattice Λ ⊥ q (D). In the real key generation algorithm this short basis is derived from a short basis for Λ ⊥ q (A) using algorithm SampleRight. Unfortunately, B has no short basis for Λ ⊥ q (A). Instead, as explained below, B builds a low-norm matrix S f ∈ Z m×m q such that B f = AS f −y * G. Because y * = y, algorithm B can construct the required key as R f ← SampleLeft(A, S f , (y − y * ), D, σ).
The remaining question is how does algorithm B build a low-norm matrix S f ∈ Z m×m q such that B f = AS f − y * G. To do so B uses Eval sim giving it the secret matrices S * i . More precisely, B runs Eval sim (f, (x * i , S * i ) i=1 , A) and obtains the required S f . This lets B answer all private key queries.
To complete the proof it is not difficult to show that B can build a challenge ciphertext c * for the attribute vector x ∈ Z q that lets it solve the given LWE instance using adversary A. An important point is that B cannot construct a key that decrypts c * . The reason is that it cannot build a secret key sk y,f for functions where f (x * ) = y and these are the only keys that will decrypt c * .
Proof of Theorem 4.2. The proof proceeds in a sequence of games where the first game is identical to the ABE game from Definition 2.1. In the last game in the sequence the adversary has advantage zero. We show that a PPT adversary cannot distinguish between the games which will prove that the adversary has negligible advantage in winning the original ABE security game. The LWE problem is used in proving that Games 2 and 3 are indistinguishable.
Game 0. This is the original ABE security game from Definition 2.1 between an attacker A against our scheme and an ABE challenger.
Game 1.
Recall that in Game 0 part of the public parameters mpk are generated by choosing random matrices B 1 , . . . , B in Z n×m q . At the challenge phase (step 4 in Definition 2.1) a challenge ciphertext c * is generated. We let S * 1 , . . . , S * ∈ {−1, 1} m×m denote the random matrices generated for the creation of c * in the encryption algorithm Enc.
In Game 1 we slightly change how the matrices B 1 , . . . , B are generated for the public parameters. Let x * = (x * 1 , . . . , x * ) ∈ Z q be the target point that A intends to attack. In Game 1 the random matrices S * 1 , . . . , S * in {±1} m×m are chosen at the setup phase (step 2) and the matrices B 1 , . . . , B are constructed as
The remainder of the game is unchanged. We show that Game 0 is statistically indistinguishable from Game 1 by Lemma 2.7. Observe that in Game 1 the matrices S * i are used only in the construction of B i and in the construction of the challenge ciphertext where e := (I m |S * 1 | · · · |S * ) T · e 0 is used as the noise vector for some e 0 ∈ Z m q . Let S * = (S * 1 | · · · |S * ), then by Lemma 2.7 the distribution (A, A S * , e) is statistically close to the distribution (A, A , e) where A is a uniform matrix in Z n× m q . It follows that in the adversary's view, all the matrices A S * i are statistically close to uniform and therefore the B i as defined in (2) are close to uniform. Hence, the B i in Games 0 and 1 are statistically indistinguishable.
Game 2. We now change how A in mpk is chosen. In Game 2 we generate A as a random matrix in Z n×m q . The construction of B 1 , . . . , B remains as in Game 1, namely B i = A S * i − x * i G. The key generation oracle responds to private key queries (in steps 3 and 5 of Definition 2.1) using the trapdoor T G . Consider a private key query for function f ∈ F and element y ∈ Y. Only f such that y * = f (x * 1 , . . . , x * ) = y are allowed. To respond, the key generation oracle computes B f = Eval pk f, (B 1 , . . . , B ) and needs to produce a matrix R f in Z 2m×m satisfying
To do so the key generation oracle does:
and obtains a low-norm matrix S f ∈ Z m×m q such that AS f − y * G = B f . By definition of Eval sim we know that S f 2 ≤ α F .
• Finally, it responds with R f = SampleLeft (A, S f , y, D, σ) . By definition of SampleLeft we know that R f is distributed as required.
Game 2 is otherwise the same as Game 1. Since the public parameters and responses to private key queries are statistically close to those in Game 1, the adversary's advantage in Game 2 is at most negligibly different from its advantage in Game 1.
Game 3. Game 3 is identical to Game 2 except that in the challenge ciphertext (x * , c * ) the vector
is chosen as a random independent vector in Z ( +2)m q . Since the challenge ciphertext is always a fresh random element in the ciphertext space, A's advantage in this game is zero.
It remains to show that Game 2 and Game 3 are computationally indistinguishable for a PPT adversary, which we do by giving a reduction from the LWE problem.
Reduction from LWE. Suppose A has non-negligible advantage in distinguishing Games 2 and 3. We use A to construct an LWE algorithm B. 
for some random vector s ∈ Z n q and e 0 , e 1 ← χ m . Algorithm B's goal is to distinguish these two cases with non-negligible advantage by using A.
Public parameters. A begins by committing to a target point x = (x * 1 , . . . , x * ) ∈ Z m q where it wishes to be challenged. B assembles the public parameters mpk as in Game 2: choose random matrices S * 1 , . . . , S * in {±1} m×m and set
Private key queries. B answers A's private-key queries (in steps 3 and 5 of Definition 2.1) as in Game 2.
Challenge ciphertext. When B receives two messages µ 0 , µ 1 ∈ {0, 1} m from A, it prepares a challenge ciphertext by choosing a random b ← {0, 1} and computing
and
. B sends (x * , c * ) as the challenge ciphertext to A.
We argue that when the LWE challenge is pseudorandom (namely (3) holds) then c * is distributed exactly as in Game 2. First, observe that when encrypting (x * , µ b ) the matrix H constructed in the encryption algorithm Enc is
Therefore, c * 0 defined in (4) satisfies:
where e = (I m |S * 1 | · · · |S * ) T · e 0 . This e is sampled from the same distribution as the noise vector e in algorithm Enc. We therefore conclude that c * 0 is computed as in Game 2. Moreover, since c out = D T s + e 1 we know that the entire challenge ciphertext c * is a valid encryption of (x * , µ b ) as required.
When the LWE challenge is random we know that c in and c out are uniform in Z m q . Therefore the public parameters and c * 0 defined in (4) are uniform and independent in Z ( +1)m q by a standard application of the left over hash lemma (e.g. Theorem 8.38 of [Sho08] ) where the universal hash function is defined as multiplication by the random matrix (A T |c in ) T . Since c out is also uniform, the challenge ciphertext overall is uniform in Z ( +2)m q , as in Game 3.
Guess. Finally, A guesses if it is interacting with a Game 2 or Game 3 challenger. B outputs A's
guess as the answer to the LWE challenge it is trying to solve.
We already argued that when the LWE challenge is pseudorandom the adversary's view is as in Game 2. When the LWE challenge is random the adversary's view is as in Game 3. Hence, B's advantage in solving LWE is the same as A's advantage in distinguishing Games 2 and 3, as required. This completes the description of algorithm B and completes the proof.
Remark 4.3. We note that the matrix R f in KeyGen FKHE can alternatively be generated using a sampling method from [MP12] . To do so we choose FKHE public parameters as we do in the security proof by choosing random matrices S i , . . . , S in {±1} m×m and setting B i = A S i . We then define the matrix B f as B f := AS f where S f = Eval sim (f, ((0, S i )) i=1 , A). We could then build the secret key matrix sk y,f = R f satisfying (A|yG + B f ) · R f = D directly from the bit decomposition of D/y. Adding suitable low-norm noise to the result will ensure that sk y,f is distributed as in the simulation in the security proof. Note that this approach can only be used to build secret keys sk y,f when y = 0 where as the method in KeyGen FKHE works for all y.
Evaluation Algorithms for Arithmetic Circuits
In this section we build the FKHE-enabling algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) that are at the heart of the FKHE construction in Section 4. We do so for the family of polynomial depth, unbounded fan-in arithmetic circuits.
Evaluation algorithms for gates
We first describe Eval algorithms for single gates, i.e. when G is the set of functions that each takes k inputs and computes either weighted addition or multiplication:
We assume that all the inputs to a multiplication gate (except possibly one input) are integers in the interval [−p, p] for some bound p < q.
We present all three deterministic Eval algorithms at once:
Output the following matrices and the ciphertext:
• For a weighted multiplication gate g(x 1 , . . . ,
For multiplication gates, the reason we need an upper bound p on all but one of the inputs x i is that these x i values are used in (10) and we need the norm of S g and the norm of the noise in the ciphertext c g to be bounded from above. The next two lemmas show that these algorithms satisfy the required properties to be FKHE-enabling.
Lemma 4.4. Let β g (m) = km. For a weighted addition gate g(x) = α 1 x 1 + . . . + α k x k we have:
) where ∆ ≤ β g (m)·δ and B g = Eval pk (g, (B 1 , . . . , B k ) ).
The output S
Proof. By Eq. 7 the output ciphertext is computed as follows:
The noise bound is:
Lemma 2.4,part 4 ≤ km·δ. This completes the proof of the first part of the lemma.
In the second part of the lemma, by Eq. 7 the output matrix B g is computed as follows:
The next Lemma proves similar bounds for a multiplication gate. k i=j+1 x i R T j e j . Then the output ciphertext is computed as follows:
s + e g = // use Eq. 9 to cancel terms
The bound on the noise e g is:
This completes the first part of the lemma. In the second part of the lemma, the output matrix B g is computed as follows:
Eq. 9 = . . .
Moreover, the bound on the norm of S g is:
as required.
Evaluation algorithms for circuits
We will now show how using the algorithms for single gates, that compute weighted additions and multiplications as described above, to build algorithms for the depth d, unbounded fan-in circuits. Let {C λ } λ∈N be a family of polynomial-size arithmetic circuits. For each C ∈ C λ we index the wires of C following the notation in [GVW13] . The input wires are indexed 1 to , the internal wires have indices + 1, + 2, . . . , |C| − 1 and the output wire has index |C|, which also denotes the size of the circuit. Every gate g w : Z kw q → Z q (in G as per 5) is indexed as a tuple (w 1 , . . . , w kw , w)
where k w is the fan-in of the gate. We assume that all (but possibly one) of the input values to the multiplication gates are bounded by p which is smaller than scheme modulus q. The "fan-out wires" in the circuit are given a single number. That is, if the outgoing wire of a gate feeds into the input of multiple gates, then all these wires are indexed the same. For some λ ∈ N, define the family of functions F = {f : f can be computed by some C ∈ C λ }. Again we will describe the three Eval algorithms together, but it is easy to see that they can be separated.
Let f be computed by some circuit C ∈ C λ , that has input wires. We construct the required matrices inductively input to output gate-by-gate.
For all w ∈ [C] denote the value that wire w carries when circuit C is evaluated on x or x * to be x w or x * w respectively. Consider an arbitrary gate of fan-in k w (we will omit the subscript w where it is clear from the context): (w 1 , . . . , w k , w) that computes the function g w : Z k q → Z q . Each wire w i caries a value x w i . Suppose we already computed B w 1 , . . . , B w k , S w 1 , . . . , S w k and c w 1 , . . . , c w k , note that if w 1 , . . . , w k are all in {1, 2, . . . , } then these matrices and vectors are the inputs of the corresponding Eval functions.
Using Eval algorithms described in Section 4.2, compute
Output B f := B |C| , c f := c |C| , S f := S |C| . Next we show that these outputs satisfy the required properties.
Lemma 4.6. Let β(m) = , (B 1 , . . . , B ) ).
Proof. By Lemma 4.4 and 4.5, after each level of the circuit the noise is multiplied by β gw (m), which is upperbounded by β(m) and the total number of levels is equal to the depth d of the circuit. The lemma follows.
Lemma 4.7. Let β(m) be as defined in Lemma 4.6. If S 1 , . . . , S are random matrices in {±1} m×m , then the output
By Lemma 4.4 and 4.5, after each level of the circuit the bound on S gets multiplied by at most β(m), therefore after d levels, which is the depth of the circuit, the bound on the output matrix will be S f 2 ≤ (β(m)) d · 20 √ m. The lemma follows.
In summary, algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) are α F -FKHE enabling for
This is sufficient for polynomial depth arithmetic circuits as discussed in the introduction.
ABE with Short Secret Keys for Arithmetic Circuits from LWE
The FKHE for a family of functions F = {f : (Z q ) → Z q } we constructed in Section 4 immediately gives a key-policy ABE as discussed in Section 3. For completeness we briefly describe the resulting ABE system. Given FKHE-enabling algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) for a family of functions F from Section 4.1, the ABE system works as follows:
• Setup(1 λ , ): Choose n, q, χ, m and σ as in "Parameters" in Section 4.
Run algorithm TrapGen(1 n , 1 m , q) (Lemma 2.4, part 1) to generate (A, T A ).
Choose random matrices D, B 1 , . . . , B ∈ Z n×m q and output the keys: , (B 1 , . . . , B ) ). Output sk f := R f where R f is a low-norm matrix in Z 2m×m sampled from the discrete
Note that the secret key sk f is always in Z 2m×m independent of the complexity of the function f .
• Enc(mpk, x ∈ Z q , µ ∈ {0, 1} m ): Choose a random vector s ← Z n q and error vectors e 0 , e 1 ← χ m . Choose uniformly random matrices
This completes the description of the system. The proof of the following security theorem follows from Theorems 4.2 and 3.2.
Theorem 4.8. For FKHE-enabling algorithms (Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim ) for the family of functions F, the ABE system above is correct and selectively-secure with respect to F, assuming the (n, q, χ)-LWE assumption holds where n, q, χ are the parameters for the FKHE-enabling algorithms.
Extensions

Key Delegation
Our ABE easily extends to support full key delegation. We first sketch the main idea for adding key delegation and then describe the resulting ABE system.
In the ABE scheme from Section 4.4, a secret key for a function f is a matrix R f that maps (A|B f ) to some fixed matrix D. Instead, we can give as a secret key for f a trapdoor (i.e. a short basis) T F for the matrix F = (A|B f ). The decryptor could use T F to generate the matrix R f herself using algorithm SampleD. Now, for a given function g, to construct a secret key that decrypts whenever the attribute vector x satisfies f (x) = g(x) = 0 we extend the trapdoor for F into a trapdoor for (F|B g ) = (A|B f |B g ) using algorithm ExtendRight. We give a randomized version of this trapdoor as a delegated secret key for f ∧ g. Intuitively this trapdoor can only be used to decrypt if the decryptor can obtain the ciphertexts under matrices B f and B g which by security of ABE can only happen if the ciphertexts was created for an attribute vector x satisfying f (x) = g(x) = 0.
The top level secret key generated by Keygen is a (2m×2m) matrix in Z. After k delegations the secret key becomes a ((k + 1)m × (k + 1)m) matrix. Hence, the delegated key grows quadratically with the number of delegations k.
Definition. Formally, a delegatable attribute-based encryption (DABE) scheme is an attributebased encryption scheme that in addition to four standard algorithms (Setup, Keygen, Enc, Dec) offers a delegation algorithm Delegate. Consider a ciphertext c encrypted for index vector x. The algorithm Keygen returns the secret key sk f for function f and this key allows to decrypt the ciphertext c only if f (x) = 0. The delegation algorithm given the key sk f and a function g outputs a "delegated" secret key that allows to decrypt the ciphertext only if f (x) = 0 ∧ g(x) = 0, which is a more restrictive condition. The idea can be generalized to arbitrary number of delegations:
Takes as input the master secret key msk, the function f k+1 ∈ F and the secret key sk f 1 ,...,f k that was generated either by algorithm Keygen, if k = 1 or by algorithm Delegate, if k > 1. Outputs a secret key sk f 1 ,...,f k+1 .
Correctness. We require the scheme to give a correct ABE as discussed in Section 2.1 and in addition to satisfy the following requirement. For all sequence of functions f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ F, a message m ∈ M and index x ∈ Z q , s.t.
with an overwhelming probability over the choice of (mpk, msk)
Security. The security of DABE schemes is derived from definition of selective security for ABE scheme (see Definition 2.1) by providing the adversary with access to a key-generation oracle.
Definition 5.1 (Selectively-secure DABE). A DABE scheme Π = (Setup, Keygen, Enc, Dec, Delegate) for a class of functions F = {F λ } λ∈N with = (λ) inputs over an index space X = {X λ } λ∈N and a message space M = {M λ } λ∈N is selectively secure if for any probabilistic polynomial-time adversary A, there exists a negligible function ν(λ) such that
where for each b ∈ {0, 1} and λ ∈ N the experiment Expt
sDABE,Π,A (λ) is defined as follows:
4. c * ← Enc(mpk, x * , µ b ).
5. b ← A KG(msk,x * ,·) (c * , state 2 ).
6. Output b ∈ {0, 1}.
Here the key-generation oracle KG(msk, x * , (f 1 , . . . , f k )) takes a set of functions f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ F and returns the secret key sk f 1 ,...,f k if f 1 (x * ) = 0 ∨ . . . ∨ f k (x * ) = 0 and otherwise the oracle returns ⊥. The secret key sk f 1 ,...,f k is defined as follows: sk f 1 = KeyGen(msk, f 1 ) and for all i ∈ {2, . . . , k} sk f 1 ,...,f i = Delegate(mpk, sk f 1 ,...,f i−1 , f i ).
A delegatable ABE scheme from LWE
The DABE scheme will be almost identical to ABE scheme described earlier, except as a secret key for function f instead of recoding matrix from (A|B f ) to D we will give the rerandomized trapdoor for (A|B f ) and then the decryptor can build the recoding matrix to D himself.
√ log m) (we will set σ as before:
Parse the secret key sk f 1 ,...,f k as a matrix T k ∈ Z (k+1)m×(k+1)m q which is a trapdoor for the , (B 1 , . . . , B ) ). Build the basis for matrix
. Note that the size of the key grows quadratically with the number of delegations k.
Otherwise parse the secret key sk f 1 ,...,f k as a matrix T k ∈ Z (k+1)m×(k+1)m q which is a trapdoor for the matrix (A|B
q . Note that c in and c out stay the same across all
Correctness. To show correctness, note that when f 1 (x) = 0∧. . .∧f k (x) = 0 we know by the requirement on Eval ct that the resulting ciphertexts
T s + e where ||e || < k∆ + χ max < (kα F + 1)χ max .
We know that (A|B f 1 | . . . |B f k ) · R = D and ||R T || 2 < (k + 1)mσ k with overwhelming probability by Lemma 2.5. Therefore
Finally,
with overwhelming probability. The bound on α F : α 2 F m k/2+1 < 1 4(k+2) · (q/χ max ) ensures that this quantity is less than q/4 thereby ensuring correct decryption of all bits of µ ∈ {0, 1} m .
Security. The security game is similar to the security game for FKHE, described in Section 4, except in Game 2 we need to answer delegated key queries. Consider a private key query sk f 1 ,...,f k , where f 1 , . . . , f k ∈ F. This query is only allowed when f 1 (x * ) = 0 ∨ . . . ∨ f k (x * ) = 0. Without loss of generality, assume that f 1 (x * ) = 0 ∧ . . . ∧ f k−1 (x * ) = 0 and f k (x * ) = 0. Indeed for all other cases, the adversary may ask for the key for a smaller sequence of functions and delegate herself. The key generation oracle for all i ∈ [k] computes B f i = Eval pk f i , (B 1 , . . . , B ) and needs to produce a trapdoor
. Because y * = 0 the key generation oracle can obtain a trapdoor T (A|B f k ) by running
And then produce T (A|B f k |B f 1 |...|B f k−1 ) by running
Now we can switch the rows of the matrix T (A|B f k |B f 1 |...|B f k−1 ) to get the matrix T F , which is a trapdoor for (A|B f 1 | . . . |B f k ). This operation, as well as ExtendRight function (according to Lemma 2.4, part 2) does not change the Gram-Schmidt norm of the basis, therefore this trapdoor satisfies
where the bound on T G GS is from Lemma 2.4 (part 4).
• Finally, it responds with rerandomized trapdoor
By definition of RandBasis we know that
as needed for algorithm RandBasis in Lemma 2.6 (part 3).
Polynomial gates
We can further reduce the depth of a given arithmetic circuit (and thereby shrink the required lattice sizes) by allowing the circuit to use more general gates than simple addition and multiplication. For example, the k-way OR gate polynomial can be implemented using a single gate.
Definition 5.2. An -variate polynomial is said to have restricted arithmetic complexity ( , d, g) if it can be computed by a depth-d circuit that takes inputs x 1 , . . . , x ∈ Z q and outputs a single x ∈ Z q . The circuit contains g gates, each of them is either a fan-in 2 addition gate or a fan-in 2 multiplication gate. Multiplication gates are further restricted to have one of their two inputs be one of the inputs to the circuit: x 1 , . . . , x .
We build the Eval algorithms for polynomials with complexity ( , d, g) whose running time is proportional to g and that increase the magnitude of the noise in a given ciphertext by a factor of at most O(p d · m), where p is the bound on all the intermediate values. Were we to directly use the Eval algorithms from the previous section on this polynomial, the magnitude of the noise would increase by O((pm) d ) which is considerably larger, especially when p is small (e.g. p = 1).
We can build arithmetic circuits using polynomials with complexity ( , d, g) as gates. Evaluating a depth D arithmetic circuit with such polynomial gates would increase the magnitude of the noise by at most a factor of O((p d · m) D ). Again, if we were to simply treat the circuit as a standard arithmetic circuit with basic addition and multiplication gates the noise would instead grow as O((pm) dD ) which is larger.
Next we present ABE-enabling algorithms Eval pk , Eval ct , Eval sim for these enhanced polynomial gates with the noise bounds discussed in the previous paragraph. To support multiplication and addition of constants, we may assume that we have an extra 0-th input to the circuit that always carries the value 1. We present all three algorithms at the same time. Suppose that f is a polynomial with complexity ( , d, g), then the three algorithms work as follows:
For each wire w ∈ [|f |] (here |f | denotes the total number of wires in the circuit and the notation of naming the wires is as described in Section 4.3) starting from the input wires and proceeding to the output we will construct the matrices B w ∈ Z n×m q , S w ∈ Z m×m q , c w ∈ Z m q . Finally we output B f = B |f | , S f = S |f | , c f = c |f | . Consider an arbitrary gate and suppose that matrices on the input wires are computed, then to compute the matrices on the output wire do the following:
• Suppose the gate computes addition, has input wires w 1 and w 2 and output wire w. Then set the output matrices on wire w to be:
• Suppose the gate computes the multiplication by x i for some i ∈ [ ], the input wires are u and i, the output wire is w. Then generate matrix R ∈ Z m×m q to satisfy GR = −B u by running R = BD(−B u ). Output
Note that the amount of work required to run the Eval algorithms is proportional to the number of gates g in the circuit. The following lemma shows that the noise in the output ciphertext grows by at most the factor of O(p d m), where p is the upper bound on the intermediate values in the circuit.
Lemma 5.3. If c i ∈ E s,δ (x i , B i ) for some s ∈ Z n q , δ > 0 and the bound on the numbers p ≥ 2, then for the polynomial f of complexity ( , d, g) with , (B 1 , . . . , B ) ) and ∆ < β d (m) · δ,
Proof. We prove the lemma by induction.
• Consider an addition gate at level i with input wires w 1 and w 2 and output wire w. Suppose for j ∈ [2], the noise in the ciphertexts ||e w j || ≤ β i−1 (m)δ and
• Consider a gate which has input wires u and i ∈ [ ], output wire w and which computes multiplication. Suppose ||e u || ≤ β i−1 (m) and ||S u || 2 ≤ β i−1 (m) · γ, then the following holds
Now combining Lemma 5.3 and lemmas analogous to Lemmas 4.6, 4.7 we can build an ABE system for a set of functions F which can be computed by depth D circuits with (k, d, g)-complexity gates. The bound function will then be
The time complexity of the Eval algorithms for circuit C that consists of (k, d, g)-complexity gates will be O(g · |C|).
Example applications for polynomial gates
Unbounded fan-in OR gate. Assuming that boolean inputs are interpreted as integers in {0, 1}, the OR gate of inputs can be computed with the following recursive formula:
It is easy to see that OR has restricted complexity ( , 3 , 3 ) , since at each of the iterations we do one multiplication by x +1 and two fan-in 2 additions. Therefore, by Lemma 5.3, an OR gate increases the noise in the ciphertext by a factor of O( · m).
If we were computing the OR function with addition and multiplication gates as in Section 4.3, the most efficient way would be to use the De Morgan's law:
This function can be computed with one level of fan-in-2 addition gates (to compute (1 − x i ) for i ∈ [ ]), one level of a single fan-in-multiplication gate (to compute i=1 (1 − x i )) and one more level of a single fan-in-2 addition gate. The noise then will grow by a factor of O( · m 3 ), which will make the scheme 3 times less efficient.
The Fibonacci polynomial. Consider the following polynomial, defined for x ∈ [−p, p] using the following recurrence:
If expanded, the number of monomials in Π is equal to the -th Fibonacci number, which is exponential in . The degree of the polynomial is 2 . The recurrence shows that the restricted arithmetic complexity of this polynomial is ( , , 2 ). Therefore, we can compute it with a single polynomial gate and, by Lemma 5.3, the growth in ciphertext noise will be proportional to p · m. We conjecture that computing this polynomial with a polynomial-size arithmetic circuit requires linear depth in . Therefore, the growth in ciphertext noise using the approach of Section 4.3 will be proportional to (pm) O( ) which is much worse.
ABE with Short Ciphertexts from Multi-linear Maps
We assume familiarity with multi-linear maps [BS02, GGH13a] , which we overview in Section 2.3.
Intuition. We assume that the circuits consist of and and or gates. To handle general circuits (with negations), we can apply De Morgan's rule to transform it into a monotone circuit, doubling the number of input attributes (similar to [GGH + 13c] ).
The inspiration of our construction comes from the beautiful work of Applebaum, Ishai, Kushilevitz and Waters [AIKW13] who show a way to compress the garbled input in a (single use) garbling scheme all the way down to size |x| + poly(λ). This is useful to us in the context of ABE schemes due to a simple connection between ABE and reusable garbled circuits with authenticity observed in [GVW13] . In essence, they observe that the secret key for a function f in an ABE scheme corresponds to the garbled circuit for f , and the ciphertext encrypting an attribute vector x corresponds to the garbled input for x in the reusable garbling scheme. Thus, the problem of compressing ciphertexts down to size |x| + poly(λ) boils down to the question of generalizing [AIKW13] to the setting of reusable garbling schemes. We are able to achieve this using multilinear maps.
Security of the scheme relies on a generalization of the bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption to the multi-linear setting (see Definition 2.9). 1 The bilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption was recently used to prove the security of the first broadcast encryption with constant size ciphertexts [BGW05] (which in turn can be thought of as a special case of ABE with short ciphertexts.) Theorem 6.1 (Selective security). For all polynomials d max = d max (λ), there exists a selectivelysecure attribute-based encryption with ciphertext size poly(d max ) for any family of polynomial-size circuits with depth at most d max and input size , assuming hardness of (d + 1, )−Multilinear Diffie-Hellman Exponent Assumption.
Our Construction
• Params(1 λ , d max ): The parameters generation algorithm takes the security parameter and the maximum circuit depth. It generates a multi-linear map G(1 λ , k = d+1) that produces groups (G 1 , . . . , G k ) along with a set of generators g 1 , . . . , g k and map descriptors {e ij }. It outputs the public parameters pp = {G i , g i } i∈ [k] , {e ij } i,j∈ [k] , which are implicitly known to all of the algorithms below.
• Setup(1 ): For each input bit i ∈ {1, 2, . . . , }, choose a random element q i in Z p . Let g = g 1 be the generator of the first group. Define h i = g q i . Also, choose α at random from Z p and let t = g α k . Set the master public key mpk := (h 1 , . . . , h , t) and the master secret key as msk := α.
• Keygen(msk, C): The key-generation algorithm takes a circuit C with input bits and a master secret key msk and outputs a secret key sk C defined as follows.
1. Choose randomly (r 1 , z 1 ), . . . , (r , z ) from Z 2 q for each input wire of the circuit C. In addition, choose (r +1 , a +1 , b +1 ), . . . , (r n , a n , b n ) from Z 3 q randomly for all internal wires of C. Hence, K 3 Γ can be computed by the adversary by applying j pairings to the challenge components g c 1 , g , g c 2 , . . . , g c j−1 and using the other known randomness components.
The adversary performs the symmetric operations if C(x * ) v = 0.
6. Set σ = g α−rn k−1 . Note that since C(x * ) = 0 the component r n embeds parts challenge into it. Hence, σ can be computed by the adversary due to cancellation in the exponent: α − r n = c . Otherwise, it outputs that β is randomly chosen in the target.
Applications and Extensions
Single-Key Functional Encryption and Reusable Garbled Circuits
Goldwasser, Kalai, Popa, Vaikuntanathan and Zeldovich showed how to obtain a Single-Key Functional Encryption (SKFE) and Reusable Garbled Circuits from: (1) Attribute-based Encryption, (2) Fully-Homomorphic Encryption and (3) "one-time" Garbled Circuits [GKP + 13b] . In this section we show what we gain in efficiency in the secret key and ciphertext sizes for these two construction by using our ABE schemes.
Theorem 7.1 ([GKP + 13b]).
There is a (fully/selectively secure) single-key functional encryption scheme FE for any class of circuits C that take bits of input and produce a one-bit output, assuming the existence of (1) C-homomorphic encryption scheme, (2) a (fully/selectively) secure ABE scheme for a related class of predicates and (3) Yao's Garbling Scheme, where:
